State punitive damages reforms have altered how courts award punitive damages. We model the decision to award punitive damages as a two-step process involving the decision to award any punitive damages and the decision of what amount to award. Using samples of trial court verdicts from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, we find that punitive damages caps reduce the amount of damages awarded but do not affect whether they are initially awarded. Additionally, we find that maintaining lower evidentiary standards increases both the probability that punitive damages are awarded and the size of those awards.
Introduction
Punitive damages are unique in the American civil justice system. They are not designed to compensate victims as do compensatory damages, but they are not quite equivalent to full criminal sanctions. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, punitive damages serve to punish particularly egregious behavior and deter wrongdoing in the future.
1 By increasing the costs a defendant must pay if she injures someone beyond the amount required to compensate the victim, punitive damages can efficiently deter harmful behavior if the defendant knows she will not be held liable for her actions with 100% certainty. In this way, punitive damages can discourage individuals and firms from engaging in harmful behavior or encourage them to take appropriate precautions to decrease the risk of harm to others. However, while appropriately calibrated punitive damages can efficiently deter harmful behavior, incorrectly calibrated damages can under-deter or over-deter individuals. Historically, researchers and policymakers have been more concerned with over-deterrence than underdeterrence, as evidenced by the concern over the perceived "liability crisis" that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Punitive damages can chill individuals and firms from taking desirable actions such as introducing products posing novel risks if they fear large damages awards that go beyond the amount necessary to discourage risky behavior.
In 1996, the Supreme Court of the United States began to curtail the size of punitive damages awards and limit the process by which those damages are imposed. Three primary cases succinctly summarize the Courts treatment of punitive damages: BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996 ), State Farm v. Campbell (2003 , and Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) . In all three cases, the Court limits "grossly excessive" awards that violate notions of fundamental fairness, do not provide adequate notice to parties that they may be subject to large awards (i.e., are unpredictable), and do not further the legitimate interests of the state. In State Farm, the Court specified a size limit on punitive damages awards, restricting them to no more than 10 times the amount of compensatory damages in most cases.
A number of states also have enacted tort reforms aimed at reducing or controlling punitive damages awards. Five states disallow punitive damages to some extent. The most common state reform aimed at limiting punitive damages is a cap on award sizes. For example, North Carolina caps the amount of punitive damages a court may impose at the greater of $250,000 or three times the amount of compensatory damages. Table 1 provides an overview of all states that have enacted caps along with the date of enactment. Twenty-three states have enacted a cap, and four states have repealed their caps. In general, the adoption of caps became popular starting in the 1980s, but adoptions and repeals continued throughout the 1990s and picked up in the early to mid2000s.
Despite the fact that punitive damages are awarded in less than 5% of cases, they have received a fairly substantial amount of attention in the law and economics literatures. 2 The effect or non-effect of State Farm has, along with the role of juries, dominated the empirical literature on punitive damages. However, while researchers have considered the role of State Farm (see, e.g., Del Rossi and Viscusi 2010; Eisenberg and Heise 2011) , the role of state-level reforms has not received much attention in the empirical literature on punitive damages. Some studies have considered reforms such as punitive damages caps as part of a larger analysis of the effect of tort reforms (see, e.g., Currie and Macleod 2008; Avraham and Schanzenbach 2010) . But this evidence does not extend to the effect of punitive damages caps on punitive damages awards themselves. This article explores the role of punitive damages caps and other punitive damages reforms on awards using a two-part model of the judge/jury decision to award punitive damages. The punitive damages calculus involves both discrete and continuous decisions. An adjudicator must decide whether to award punitive damages as well as the amount to award. We examine the effect of state punitive damages reforms using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts (CJSSC) data, which provide a broad national sample of state court trials. We find that punitive damages caps effectively reduce the amount of punitive damages awarded at trial but have no statistically significant effect on the adjudicators decision to award punitive damages.
Punitive Caps, Other State Reforms, and the Decision to Award Punitive Damages

State Reforms
While much of the attention on measures designed to attenuate punitive damages has focused on the role of State Farm and federal cases, states arguably play a greater role in how courts award punitive damages. Several states have simply banned punitive damages, 3 and several other states ban them in general and only allow their imposition in specifically authorized circumstances.
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However, the extreme policy choice of banning punitive damages is not common. Among the states that permit punitive damages awards but attempt to limit or control them in some way, punitive damages caps are a common option. These caps take a variety of forms. Some states, such as North Carolina, prohibit punitive damages over an absolute dollar value or a multiple of the compensatory damages award in the same case. North Carolina does not permit a court to exceed this cap, but Georgia, which has a cap of similar form to North Carolina, allows courts to ignore the cap if the defendants behavior was particularly egregious. Mississippi has a relatively complicated punitive damages cap that shifts depending on the net worth of the defendant. Our analysis does not explore the mechanism by which punitive damages caps exert their influence. Doing so would essentially require a state-by-state analysis, as no two caps are based on the exact same statutory language. In general, jurors are not aware of the cap. However, one would expect plaintiffs attorneys to adapt by requesting an award that is likely to be in compliance with a cap, and judges, who are aware of the cap, can limit awards as well. Unless the state statute creating the punitive damages cap explicitly provides for circumstances when it may be increased or ignored, judges must impose the cap on any punitive damages award. If they fail to do so, a state appeals court or state supreme court has the authority to reverse the trial courts ruling. AL  1987  1993  1999  Current  AK  1998  Current  AR  2003  Current  CO  1987  Current  CT  1979  Current  FL  1987  Current  GA  1988  Current  ID  2004  Current  IL  1995  1997  IN  1995  Current  KS  1988  Current  ME  1991  Current  MS  2004  Current  MO  2006  Current  MT  1985  1986  2004  Current  NV  1989  Current  NH  1987  Current  NJ  1996  Current  NC  1996  Current  ND  1993  Current  OH  1997  1998  2005  Current  OK  1996  Current  TX  1988  Current While punitive damages caps have been the most popular approach for states seeking to limit punitive damages awards, some states have attempted to attenuate punitive damages awards through more indirect means by changing the process by which courts impose damages or the standards that plaintiffs must meet to obtain awards. One reform that changes the process by which courts make decisions about punitive damages is to require or allow (at the request of one or both parties) bifurcated trials. In a bifurcated trial, the decision of whether to award punitive damages and the amount of those damages occurs in a separate trial process from the decisions of liability and whether to award other damages. This means that juries may consider different evidence at different parts of the trial, leading to changes in how they determine the appropriate amount of punitive damages to award.
States can also change the dynamics of the decision to award punitive damages by changing the underlying legal standards plaintiffs must meet to obtain an award. In civil cases, plaintiffs must usually establish their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, which most courts interpret as requiring the plaintiff to establish that it is more likely than not that her claims are true. Some states have raised this evidentiary standard from a preponderance of the evidence standard to a clear and convincing evidence standard. Courts disagree on exactly how much stricter a clear and convincing standard is than a preponderance standard, but in all courts, even if the plaintiff establishes that it is more likely than not that her claims are true, she will not necessarily prevail. In general, courts ask whether the plaintiff has clearly convinced the adjudicator of the truth of her claims as opposed to asking whether it is more likely that the plaintiffs or defendants claims are true. A few states have even increased the evidentiary standard to a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt-the standard used in criminal trials.
In addition to meeting the evidentiary standard, plaintiffs must also establish that the defendant acted in a certain way in order to obtain damages in a civil trial. Typically, plaintiffs must only establish that a defendant acted negligently in order to obtain damages under a tort theory of liability-most punitive damages cases involve tort law directly or rely on a tort theory of liability. However, many states have increased the conduct standard beyond negligence (or gross negligence) to recklessness or intentionality. Although the language differs by state, under a recklessness standard, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with reckless indifference that a given harm would occur or that the defendant ignored a high probability that a given harm would occur. Under a malice or intent standard, the plaintiff must essentially prove that the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff through some action.
Modeling the Punitive Damages Decision
To test the effect of different reforms on punitive damages awards, we develop a two-part empirical model. We estimate two-part models instead of familiar difference-in-difference models for two important reasons. First, courts do not award punitive damages very often, and the use of a two-part model more fully captures the potential reasons for the large number of zero punitive damages awards as well as the different ways state-level reforms may alter the decision to award punitive damages. Second, data on punitive damages are generally available only for a limited number of years and a limited number of states. Based on this limited availability, it is generally not possible to obtain sufficient data to allow for the state by state variation over time that is necessary for the identification of difference-in-difference models.
A well-known application of two-part models is within the context of the RAND health insurance experiment (Manning et al. 1987) . Eisenberg et al. (2015) discuss extensively the appropriateness of using two-part models in connection with punitive damages; however, they do not consider the effect of any legal reforms in their analysis. In the general model, let individuals with an observed outcome be participants in the relevant activity.
5 Let d51 for participants and 0 for nonparticipants, and suppose a positive outcome, y, is observed for participants and a 0 outcome is observed for nonparticipants. For nonparticipants, only Pr d50 ð Þis observed while the conditional density of the outcome, y, for y > 0 is given for participants by f yjd51 ð Þ . A two-part model for the outcome of interest is given by the following:
where x is a vector of regressors. First developed by Cragg (1971) Madden (2008) . In this model, an observed zero can result from a decision not to award any punitive damages, or an observed zero can result from a zero punitive damages award. Because a zero can result from either of these two ways, it is called a "double-hurdle" model.
Suppose an adjudicator faces the decision of awarding punitive damages, and suppose this adjudicator wishes to set punitive damages to optimize deterrence. Consistent with the Supreme Courts rulings, she only wishes to punish and deter reprehensible acts.
6 When setting punitive damages in a given case, she faces two decisions: (i) whether to award punitive damages given the reprehensibility of the act, and (ii) what amount of punitive damages is appropriate to deter this type of act. The first decision corresponds to the participation decision described above, and we call this the "award decision." The second decision corresponds to the relevant outcome, y, discussed above, and we call this the "amount decision." An adjudicator may award no punitive damages based on either decision. First, she may determine that the defendants actions were not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant punishment even if she would prefer to deter future defendants from taking similar actions. Second, she may determine that the defendants actions were sufficiently bad to deserve punishment but that the punitive damages necessary to punish and deter the defendant (and other agents) are zero based on the facts of the case and other damages and sanctions imposed. The fact that juries occasionally award $1.00 (one dollar) in nominal punitive damages to acknowledge the reprehensibility of the defendants actions without actually deterring future behavior implies that adjudicators do, in fact, make the decision to award and the decision of the amount to award separately.
The explanation here closely follows that of Cameron and Trivedi (2005) . 6 The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that only sufficiently reprehensible acts by defendants warrant punitive damages and that the only reasons punitive damages may be imposed are punishment and deterrence. The Court has reiterated this holding in at least three major cases: BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) Importantly, different types of state reforms may affect adjudicators in different ways at different points of the decision process. For example, damages caps would likely not affect the decision of whether a defendant acted sufficiently reprehensibly to warrant the imposition of punitive damages, so caps likely only affect the second part of the adjudicators decision process. However, reforms to the conduct or evidentiary standard likely affect whether the adjudicator will find the defendants actions sufficiently reprehensible but not necessarily the amount of punitive damages necessary to deter that act in the future.
Because the adjudicators decision process corresponds neatly to a two-part model and because different reforms may have different effects on each decision, we develop a double-hurdle model of the decision to award punitive damages. These models have been applied in many other contexts such as tobacco and alcohol consumption (Madden 2008) and in the consumption of medical services (Manning et al. 1987) . Eisenberg et al. (2015) consider a variety of approaches to model damages awards and conclude that two-part models are most appropriate for punitive damages.
Our double-hurdle model consists of three basic parts: awarded/observed punitive damages awards, the award equation, and the amount equation. Let D represent the amount of damages awarded at trial, and let D be given by D5f D ð Þ5ID a . I is an indicator for whether the adjudicator decides to award punitive damages based on the following award equation:
where Z is a vector of variables influencing the decision to award punitive damages and a is a vector of estimated coefficients. The amount equation is given by D a 5max 0; D m ð Þ , where D m 5X 0 b1e 2 . Here, X represents a vector of variables influencing the decision of what amount of punitive damages to award, and b is a vector of estimated coefficients. The terms e 1 and e 2 are additive disturbance terms which are randomly distributed according to a bivariate normal distribution. In this model, the first stage incorporates a probit model to estimate the effect of the independent variables on the decision to award punitive damages (the award decision), and the second stage incorporates a truncated normal regression to estimate the effect of the independent variables on the amount of punitive damages to award (the amount decision). Based on this model, the final amount of punitive damages may be zero if either the award or amount equation results in a zero. While the general model can accommodate the multistep decision process that underlies punitive damages, it requires imposing distributional assumptions on the error terms as well as some assumptions about functional form. These assumptions may be violated in reality, but estimating models with fewer assumptions risks conflating different parts of the punitive damages decision (each of which may be sensitive to different legal reforms), which can ultimately result in biased estimates of the effects of legal reforms. For example, estimating a simple ordinary least squares model or Tobit model would not allow independent variables to have different effects on the award and amount decisions.
The general model outlined above includes a number of familiar models as special cases, depending on which simplifying assumptions are made. 8 First, assuming that e 1 and e 2 are independently distributed yields the familiar Cragg model. Second, an alternative simplifying assumption is what prior work has called "first hurdle dominance" (see, e.g., Madden 2008) . Under this assumption, the award decision dominates the amount decision, implying that zeros arise only from the first stage. This assumption also implies that once the first hurdle (the award decision) has been cleared, zero is not an optimal choice at the amount decision stage-that is, there are no corner solutions at zero in the second stage. 9 If the first hurdle dominance assumption is combined with an assumption of dependence between the error terms, the general model above simplifies to the familiar Heckman selection model (Madden 2008 ). An important advantage of the double-hurdle model over other models is that an independent variables effect on the probability of awarding punitive damages and its effect on the amount of damages awarded are determined by separate processes. In other words, a state-level reform may have different effects on the award and amount equations within this model. These two effects would be blended together in an OLS or Tobit model. However, double-hurdle models involve more assumptions than other models. And choosing which assumptions to make-and therefore which type of double-hurdle model to estimate-involves both practical and econometric considerations.
The Cragg and Heckman approaches model somewhat different underlying processes. The Heckman model can generate estimates accounting for the possibility of latent positive amounts of punitive damages. Originally developed in the context of estimating wage equations in which some workers did not work, the Heckman model accounts for the potential wage those nonworkers would have received (Heckman 1976 (Heckman , 1979 . Here, the Heckman model can account for the potential punitive damages an adjudicator would have awarded if the defendants conduct had warranted these damages. On the other hand, the Cragg model focuses on actual outcomes. Because it does not require the first hurdle dominance assumption, a zero in the Cragg model can stem from a zero at the award or amount decision stage.
If latent punitive damages awards are not possible or if some zero punitive damages awards stem from the conclusion that zero is the appropriate amount for punishment or deterrence, then the Cragg model is a better choice for modeling the underlying punitive damages calculus. If not, then the Heckman approach may be better. In general, it is entirely possible that an adjudicator may determine that the defendants actions were sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages but decide not to impose any punitive damages because the optimal amount of damages for punishment and deterrence is zero.
For example, suppose a physician failed to diagnose a patients cancer which later necessitated the amputation of the patients leg. This is exactly the type of behavior that an adjudicator could deter through the imposition of punitive damages. However, suppose the physician failed to diagnose the cancer because, when the patient visited, the physicians child had just been seriously injured. This mitigating factor may help the physician appear more sympathetic in the adjudicators eyes. In this situation, an adjudicator may legitimately determine that the failure to diagnose a cancer and the unnecessary amputation of a patients leg are sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. However, the adjudicator may still award zero punitive damages because the physicians acts in light of the injury to her child do not warrant punishment, do not require deterrence, or simply are not sufficiently reprehensible. This example is reinforced by the multiple instances of trial courts awarding $1.00 (one dollar) in punitive damages.
10 These awards are consistent with small amounts of punitive damages being optimal at the amount decision stage once an adjudicator has answered the award question in the affirmative, as $1.00 is clearly not enough to deter or punish anyone but does serve as a statement that the defendants actions were sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. Thus, the Cragg model is more pertinent to the punitive damages decision process and is used in our preferred specifications below. Eisenberg et al. (2015) reach a similar conclusion. In addition to the practical considerations of how adjudicators make decisions, econometric considerations can also determine which model is preferable. The Heckman model requires valid exclusion restrictions in order to separately identify the award decision and the amount decision. In other words, it requires variables that affect the decision of whether to award punitive damages but not the decision of what amount to award. We use the exclusion restrictions, which are discussed in greater detail below, used by Eisenberg et al. (2010) to identify our Heckman model. However, because the Heckman model requires exclusion restrictions while the Cragg model does not and because no exclusion restriction is ideal, the Cragg model is preferable in the punitive damages context.
While the Heckman and Cragg models differ in a number of respects, they can both elucidate the effect of different state-level reforms on punitive damages at different points in the decision process. Because they both allow for different effects of the same reform on the decision to award punitive damages and the decision of what amount to award, we use both models when examining the influence of state-level reforms on punitive damages awards in the next section. Although we estimate Cragg models in our preferred specifications, we also estimate Heckman models to provide a robustness check on our results. We do not expect to obtain substantially different results from the Heckman models because, although these models involve different assumptions, they are based on the same underlying econometric model as the Cragg models. In fact, some have interpreted Cragg and Heckman models to estimate essentially the same behavioral relationship, even if they model slightly different processes (see Maddala 1985; Eisenberg et al. 2015) .
State-Level Reform Effects on Punitive Damages Awards
Data
To estimate the effect of state-level reforms on a broad sample of punitive damages awards, we use data from the CJSSC. Because the CJSSC is a large survey of state trial court decisions, it provides a general perspective on the potential impact of state reforms. The CJSSC is a project of the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for State Courts, and it includes four separate samples from state trial courts across the country-one each in 1992, 1996, 2001, and making them less appropriate points of comparison. Additionally, the 1992 sample was collected differently than the other samples.
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In each year of data collection, information from individual trials was collected directly from the offices of state court clerks, minimizing the risk of under-reporting or over-reporting damages by litigants. In addition to information on damages for each trial, the CJSSC includes information on whether a verdict was rendered by a judge or jury, the types of litigants involved, and the types of claims and counterclaims brought by litigants. The 2001 sample was collected from a random sample of 45 of the 75 largest counties in the country. The 2005 sample was similarly collected but also includes a sample of 110 smaller counties. In our primary analysis, we include all of the counties in the 2005 sample, and we report a secondary analysis using only the counties in the 2005 sample that were included in the 2001 sample in the Supporting Information Appendix.
Information on state-level tort reforms comes from the Database of State Tort Law Reforms compiled by Avraham (2014a) . This database includes years of enactment (and, in some cases, repeal) of a variety of state tort reforms. We focus on three reforms targeting punitive damages: punitive damages caps, bifurcated trials, and evidentiary reform. We further disaggregate evidentiary reform into conduct standard reform and evidentiary standard reform. Technically, an evidentiary reform would be an increase from preponderance to a higher standard, and a conduct standard reform would be an increase from negligence to a higher standard. However, because so many states have moved to higher standards, we focus on states that have maintained the lower standards. To do so, we create indicator variables that equal one if a state has maintained a lower standard (instead of creating indicator variables for the higher standards). With respect to punitive damages caps, we focus on "clever" caps as defined by Avraham (2014b) . These caps are low enough and contain few enough exceptions to have a potential effect on awards. Caps that are set too high or contain too many exceptions to be binding on most cases are excluded from this definition.
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Additionally, we collect information on whether a state partially bans punitive damages, which is defined as a state disallowing punitive damages except in very limited circumstances; whether a state partially authorizes punitive damages, which is defined as a state allowing punitive damages only in certain circumstances defined by statute; and whether a state imposes a high pleading standard on punitive damages. A high pleading standard requires that litigants seek leave of the court in order to seek punitive damages. While the underlying evidentiary standard is the same, plaintiffs must more clearly demonstrate their eligibility for punitive damages to the court beyond simply adding a line to their initial complaint. We refer collectively to these partial bans, partial authorizations, and high pleading standards as "punitive damages limits" and use them as our exclusion restrictions in our Heckman model estimation. Eisenberg et al. (2010) first used a similar specification to identify a Heckman model, and our approach is consistent with theirs.
Empirical Strategy
To test the effect of these reforms on punitive damages awards, we estimate both Cragg and Heckman models using the following general specification (with a slight abuse of notation): 11 The 1992 sample includes only jury trials-no bench trials were sampled. 12 Avraham (2014b) provides more detail on the specific criteria used to define a "clever" cap. Because some punitive damages caps are set very high, it is not clear that they would ever be binding and are thus excluded from the definition of a clever cap. States with punitive damages caps that are excluded from the clever cap definition include: Alabama (1999), Arkansas (2003) , Florida (1987) , Mississippi (2004) , Montana (2004), and Texas (1988 These two equations correspond to the two stages of the punitive damages decision. First, the adjudicator must decide whether to award punitive damages. Next, the adjudicator must decide on the appropriate amount. In these equations, the unit of observation is an individual case, indexed by i, awarded in state, s, and year, t. In the first equation, the award equation, I(PD) is an indicator for whether the court imposed punitive damages. In the second equation, the amount equation, log(PD) is the natural logarithm of punitive damages. Each equation includes the natural logarithm of compensatory damages, which prior work has consistently shown to be a good predictor of punitive damages (see, e.g., Hersch and Viscusi 2004; Eisenberg and Heise 2011) . Each also includes an interaction between this variable and an indicator for whether the case was decided in 2005, that is, after State Farm was decided. Including an interaction term between the 2005 variable and the log of compensatory damages allows us to control for a potential effect of State Farm on the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages consistent with the approaches of Del Rossi and Viscusi (2010) , Eisenberg and Heise (2011) , and Viscusi and McMichael (2014) . However, because we have only one year of data prior to State Farm and one year after, we do not draw any conclusions about what the effect of State Farm may have been.
The vector (Punitive reforms) includes indicators for the following reforms: punitive damages cap, (gross) negligence conduct standard, preponderance evidentiary standard, and bifurcated trial. We expect caps to have a negative effect on punitive damages awards; although, they may or may not have an effect on the decision to award punitive damages in the first place. We expect negative coefficients for the indicators associated with lower conduct and evidentiary standards-at least in the first stage of the two models. These lower standards make it easier for adjudicators to award punitive damages, but they may or may not affect the award amount since they may not affect the deterrence determination associated with a given award.
Jury is an indicator for whether the trial was a jury trial. Hersch and Viscusi (2004) find that juries are more likely to impose punitive damages and impose greater amounts than judges. The vector (Litigant type) includes indicators for whether all litigants in a case were individual litigants and for whether individual plaintiffs were suing government or corporate defendants. The inclusion of these controls is consistent with Hersch and Viscusi (2004) . The vector (Case type) includes indicators for whether the case involved, as the primary dispute, the following: premises liability, intentional tort, malpractice, slander/libel/defamation, negligence, buyer/seller contract dispute, employment dispute, other contract dispute, and motorvehicle torts and other claims. The omitted category is fraud. These controls are consistent with Hersch and Viscusi (2004) .
Finally, the vector (Punitive limits) appears only in the first stage equation, the award equation. It includes indicators for whether a state imposes a high pleading standard, partially bans punitive damages, or partially authorizes them. These variables serve as our exclusion restrictions when we estimate a Heckman model. A high pleading standard will affect whether punitive damages are awarded since it places additional burdens on litigants seeking them but will not affect the actual amount awarded. Partial bans and authorizations similarly will affect the probability punitive damages are awarded by making them more difficult to obtain but will not affect the actual amount of damages awarded. For a broader discussion of the effects of these laws, see Eisenberg et al. (2010) . We include these variables in the award equation of our Cragg model consistent with the recommendation of Cameron and Trivedi (2005) , but this model is identified with or without these indicators in one or both equations.
In our preferred specifications, we do not include any controls for counties. However, punitive damages are more commonly awarded in certain counties. To test whether these counties affect our results, we re-estimate all specifications with indicator variables for the eight counties that have the largest number of punitive damages awards. These are (ordered by the number of positive punitive damages awards): Los Angeles, CA; Orange, CA; Fairfax, VA; Franklin, OH; Harris, TX; Dallas, TX; Alameda, CA; and St. Louis, MO. In general, including different subsets of counties does not meaningfully change the results reported below. We note that including a full set of county fixed effects in our models is not possible because no punitive damages were awarded in many counties and many counties include only one such award during the sample period. Table 2 reports summary statistics for punitive and compensatory damages awards and for the indicator variables for various punitive damages reforms. Punitive damages are not awarded very often-only in about 5% of our sample. Among reforms, punitive damages caps cover the greatest number of cases. Interestingly, a substantial majority of cases are covered by a higher conduct or evidentiary standard than the traditional civil case standards of gross negligence, which covers about 26% of cases, and preponderance of the evidence, which covers only about 11% of the cases in our sample. Throughout our analysis, we focus only on cases won by plaintiffs. Table 3 reports results from two separate Cragg models. The first two columns report the results from a model that excludes any controls for counties, and the second two columns report results from a separate model that includes controls for the eight largest counties in our sample (in terms of punitive damages awards). The first and third columns report first stage results, and the second and fourth columns report second stage results. The first two columns report our preferred specification. Consistent with prior work, an increase in compensatory damages generates an increase in punitive damages. Because both the dependent and independent variables are in logarithmic form, the coefficient on compensatory damages reported in column 2 is an elasticity. A 10% increase in compensatory damages leads to a 3.3% increase in punitive damages. While we estimate a small, positive effect of compensatory damages on the probability that punitive damages are awarded in the first stage of the model, that effect is not statistically significant.
Results
Interestingly, individual punitive damages reforms have different effects on different parts of the adjudicators decision process. A preponderance evidentiary standard and a bifurcated trial requirement do not have statistically significant effects on either the award or amount decision; however, a damages cap and a gross negligence standard do have a statistically significant effect on the punitive damages calculus. When a gross negligence standard governs punitive damages, adjudicators are more likely to impose punitive damages. This result is consistent with adjudicators awarding punitive damages more often when plaintiffs must meet a lower standard to obtain those damages. This lower conduct standard also increases the amount of punitive damages awarded. Caps, on the other hand, do not have a statistically significant effect on the probability that an adjudicator will impose an award but reduce the amount of damages imposed. These effects are consistent with adjudicators determining the reprehensibility of an action separately from determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages to deter future bad acts or punish the defendant.
The remaining estimates are consistent with prior work. Juries are both more likely to award punitive damages and award greater amounts (see Hersch and Viscusi 2004) . 13 The 2005 indicator is associated with higher punitive damages awards for a given level of compensatory damages. This result is somewhat surprising since 2005 is post-State Farm, which placed additional limitations on punitive damages nationwide. Eisenberg and Heise (2011) discuss this counterintuitive result at length. As reported in columns 3 and 4, the results are not substantially different when controls for the eight counties with the largest number of punitive damages awards are included. The magnitudes, signs, and statistical significance of the compensatory damages variables and almost all reform variables are nearly unchanged when controls for these counties are included. However, the effect of gross negligence is no longer statistically significant in the second stage of the model and is larger in the first stage. Table 4 reports results from two separate Heckman models, 14 with the first two columns reporting the first and second stage of a model with no county controls and the second two columns reporting the first and second stage of a model with county controls included, respectively. The estimates are generally consistent with the estimates from the Cragg models. In column 2, we estimate an elasticity between punitive and compensatory damages of 0.331. The 2005 interaction term and jury indicator variable have similar effects in these models as in previous models. Again, we find no statistically significant effect of maintaining a preponderance evidentiary standard or requiring bifurcated trials. Punitive damages caps, on the other hand, reduce the amount of damages imposed but have no statistically significant effect on the decision to initially award punitive damages. We also find that a gross negligence standard affects both the decision to award punitive damages and the amount awarded. As with the Cragg results, including a set of county controls does not substantially change the estimated effects.
Robustness Checks
To test whether the results from the Cragg and Heckman models represent effects on the adjudicators decision rather than effects on the behavior of litigants in seeking punitive damages, we use the 2005 CJSSC sample, which is the only year of data to include a variable indicating whether plaintiffs sought punitive damages. Using the same specification from the first stage of our Cragg and Heckman models with an indicator for whether plaintiffs sought punitive damages 13 Because the parties to a lawsuit play a role in determining whether a judge or jury decides the case, this variable may suffer from endogeneity bias. Accordingly, we only note that juries are associated with higher punitive damages awards and higher probabilities of those awards. 14 We identify our Heckman models with the variables included in the vector (Punitive limits) as discussed above.
as the dependent variable, we find no evidence that caps, bifurcated trial requirements, or evidentiary reforms affect plaintiffs decisions to seek punitive damages. However, we estimate statistically significant relationships between the reforms used as exclusion restrictions in our Heckman model and plaintiffs decisions to seek punitive damages, consistent with the discussion above. 15 To further explore the validity of these exclusion restrictions, we estimate an OLS specification conditional on a positive amount of punitive damages being awarded. We find no statistically significant effect of any legal reform used as an exclusion restriction above. 
Discussion and Conclusion
The punitive damages calculus involves more than simply deciding what amount to award, as adjudicators face two decisions when arriving at a final punitive damages award. They first must decide whether the defendants conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to warrant punitive damages. Next, they must determine what amount of punitive damages is optimal given the circumstances. Importantly, punitive damages reforms may affect these two decisions differently or affect one and not the other. This study presents the first empirical evidence of the effect of state-level punitive damages reforms on the two different phases of adjudicators decisions. To examine the two different phases, we estimate models that specifically allow for two steps. Because these models more closely approximate the reality of awarding punitive damages than single stage models, we are able to derive more reliable estimates of the effects of different reforms on the separate phases of the decision process. Overall, we find strong evidence that state-level reforms affect the punitive damages calculus and that these reforms have a differential impact on the probability that punitive damages are awarded and the magnitude of the awards that are imposed.
Using two-part models, we estimate a statistically significant, negative coefficient for punitive damages caps in the award decision stage. This result is consistent with adjudicators assessing the reprehensibility of a defendants actions to determine whether they warrant punitive damages and separately determining the appropriate amount of damages to punish and deter. This result is also consistent with a cap binding an adjudicators decision of what amount to award but not whether to award punitive damages at all. In contrast to caps, we find evidence that maintaining a gross negligence standard affects both the award and amount decisions. These effects are consistent with plaintiffs simply having an easier time proving their cases in the face of relatively lax standards.
Prior work on punitive damages has focused on the effect of changes in federal law on those awards. Specifically, State Farm has taken on a dominant role in the literature since it represents the most direct limit on punitive damages in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In our study, however, we consider the impact of state-level reforms. The evidence demonstrates that states matter in the punitive damages calculus as well. States have enacted a variety of punitive damages reforms, and we find that these reforms can have large and statistically significant effects on punitive damages awards. Punitive damages caps, in particular, consistently reduce the amount of punitive damages awarded.
